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ARGUMENT 
This appeal boils down to two questions: (1) is the 
homestead presently available to the Estate for liquidation and 
payment of Barbara's devise; and (2) was Barbara's devise 
calculated properly by the trial court on remand. If this Court 
affirms the trial court's determination1 that Barbara is time 
barred from seeking to recover the homestead back into the 
Estate, this Court need not reach the second question. 
A. UNDER ANY THEORY, THE HOMESTEAD CANNOT BE RECOVERED BACK 
INTO THE ESTATE. 
1. The "Proceeding" Question. 
When this case was remanded after Uzelac I2 Barbara 
immediately asked the trial court to order Brooke and Allyson to 
re-deed the homestead back into the Estate. R.1495, 1497 The 
homestead had been transferred out of the Estate by deed on May 
29, 2003. Ex.21 Brooke and Allyson responded by intervening 
(R. 1529) and asserting Section 1004, which governs the 
"Liability of distributees to claimants." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-1004; R. 1583 Section 1004 states that "an undischarged 
claim not barred may be prosecuted in a proceeding against one 
or more distributees." (Emphasis added) 
1
 R.1754-1755 
2
 In this brief, the Court of Appeals' first decision, In re 
Estate of Uzelac, 2005 UT App 234, (R.1472) will be referenced 
as "Uzelac I." 
Barbara never prosecuted any action against Brooke and 
Allyson. All she ever did was file the 2003 Motion. R.912 
Since the statute of limitations for bringing Section 1004 
proceedings had run, Barbara began to argue that the 2 0 03 Motion3 
was a "proceeding." R.1636-1638 The trial court rejected this 
argument: 
It is clear that no proceedings against either of the 
distributees of the real property requested to be 
recovered has been instituted. The claim of Mrs. 
Uzelac that her claim as a creditor of the Estate was 
sufficient to put the daughters on notice is not well 
taken. The statute is clear that the action must be 
against the distributees, not the estate. 
R. 1755, % 6 Additionally, it should be noted that 
Barbara's 2003 Motion does not mention or cite Section 1004 
in any way. R.918 
On appeal, Brooke and Allyson demonstrate that if the 2 003 
Motion was a "proceeding" (though it was not "against Brooke and 
Allyson") then it was also a final appealable order under the 
longstanding authority of In re Estate of Vorhees, 336 P.2d 977 
(Utah 1961); In re Estate of Bacon, 556 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1976); 
In re Estate of Christensen v. Christensen, 655 P.2d 646 (Utah 
1982) and In re Estate of Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 
3
 The 2003 Motion was captioned as a "Motion" in this 
consolidated action of the Formal Probate (Case No. 993901690) 
and Barbara's Complaint against the Estate (Case No. 020901576). 
R.912 
2 
1997) . *Formal proceedings" are "proceedings conducted before a 
judge with notice to interested persons." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-1-201(18). Indeed, Brooke and Allyson received notice of 
the 2003 Motion (R.914) and filed a memorandum in opposition. 
R.959 Judge Dever denied the motion and made findings. R.1080 
This ruling was "final as to all persons with respect to all 
issues concerning the decedent's estate that the court 
considered . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-412. The ruling was 
"[s]ubject to appeal and . . . vacation" and modification. Id. 
Barbara employed none of these procedures. She proceeded to 
trial on her Complaint against the Estate and ultimately 
appealed after that trial. R.1366 
From the Reply Brief, it is clear that in 2003, Barbara's 
counsel was aware of the Vorhees, Bacon, Christensen and 
Morrison final judgment rule but chose not to appeal. See Reply 
Brief, p. 20, fn 13 ("Barbara's counsel faced this argument on 
another case . . . " ) . There was no appeal in 2003 because no 
one, especially Barbara, thought the 2003 Motion in the Estate 
lawsuit was a qualifying "proceeding." 
2. Part 4 of Title 3 is the Applicable Statutory Scheme. 
Attempting to avoid the law of Vorhees, Bacon, Christensen 
and Morrison, Barbara next argues that her 2 003 Motion was not a 
"Part 4 proceeding." See Reply Brief of Appellant, pp. 17-18. 
Barbara conspicuously does not distinguish Vorhees, Bacon, 
3 
Christensen or Morrison; indeed she cannot without reassuming 
her limitation problems under Sections 1004 and 1006. Barbara 
instead reasons that if she is not under Part 4, the 
unsuccessful 2003 Motion to return the homestead to the Estate 
was not final and appealable in 2003 and not res judicata now. 
When this action was filed in 1999, an Order of Formal 
Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal 
Representative was entered. R.13 Formal testcicy and 
appointment proceedings are governed by Part 4, Title 3 of the 
probate code. By contrast, informal testacy proceedings are 
governed by Part 3 and supervised administration by Part 5. 
Clearly, this action is governed by Part 4. 
In Christensen, the Utah Supreme Court noted u[a]n order 
admitting a will to probate in the course of a formal testacy 
proceeding is a final order for purposes of appeal [citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-412]. The order dismissing an omitted spouse's 
petition is similar in that it resolves an issue of vital 
importance and concludes a major phase in the process of formal 
testacy proceedings . . . The order is therefore final for 
purposes of appeal." Christensen, 655 p.2d 646, 648 (Utah 
1982)(emphasis added). 
It is hard to imagine an issue more central to this case 
than the disposition of the homestead property. It has been at 
issue from the early months of this probate action. See, e.g. 
4 
R.792 (Letter dated May 23, 2000) Morrison1s "pragmatic test" 
throws its weight toward a final order conclusion here. 
Barbara's life estate encumbers the property. After 
distribution and in reliance on the adjudication, Brooke and 
Allyson purchased the water shares to the homestead. Exs. 16, 
17 No Section 1004 or 1006 proceeding was ever filed or served. 
In Vorhees, the "order compelling a decedent's widow to transfer 
land to the estate was final although the trial court retained 
jurisdiction over the other estate matters." Morrison, 933 P. 2d 
at 1017. "The court premised its holding on the fact that the 
order decided 'the real issue' in the case and 'did not leave 
open for reconsideration the question as to who owned that 
property.'" Id. The situation here is identical. 
3. If the 2003 Motion was a Proceeding# There is No 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Alter the Order. 
Barbara points out that, in the course and scope of her 
first appeal, Uzelac I summarily vacated the September 27, 2 003 
order. However, it is well established that "questions 
regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time 
because such issues determine whether a court has authority to 
address the merits of a particular case." Ameritemps, Inc. v. 
Labor Commission, 128 P.3d 31, 2005 UT App 491. 
At the time of the first appeal, Barbara was not relying on 
the 2003 Motion to save herself from a limitations problem. 
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Prior to remand, Barbara never argued or viewed the 2003 Motion 
as a separate "proceeding." She did not appeal it within 30 
days and viewed it as a motion preliminary to her trial. She 
was still claiming to be a creditor of the Estate. R.1080 The 
2 0 03 Motion was brought in the case against the Estate and not 
"against" Brooke and Allyson. 
When, in the context of remand, Barbara realized she never 
filed any "proceeding against the distributees," she first 
characterized her 2 003 Motion as a "proceeding" under the 
probate code. R.1637 Brooke and Allyson simply argue that if_ 
the 2 003 Motion qualifies as a "proceeding" that Barbara also 
must accept the law that comes with "proceedings:" they are 
final and appealable not at the end of the case, but 3 0 days 
from issuance. Christensen, 655 P.2d at 648; Morrison, 933 P.2d 
at 1017 and Vorhees, 336 P.2d at 980. Appealable orders not 
appealed within 3 0 days are res judicata. In re Estate of Kirk, 
278 N.E. 2d 503 (111. Ct. App. 1971). If this court agrees with 
Barbara that the 2003 Motion qualifies as a "proceeding," no 
subject matter jurisdiction exists, now or at the time of Uzelac 
If for modification of that final appealable order. 
However, Brooke and Allyson continue to assert that the 
trial court was correct in finding that no "proceeding against 
either of the distributees" had been filed in 2006 and that the 
statute of limitations for doing so had run. Utah Code Ann. 
6 
§ 75-3-1006; R. 1755 Barbara's request on remand for the trial 
court to order the homestead to be re-deeded to the Estate was 
time-barred. 
4. The Homestead is an Encumbered Asset. 
In her Reply Brief, Barbara argues that the life estate was 
not "distributed" to her and that pre-distribution statutes 
apply. See Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 14. This is a new 
argument made from the perspective of one backed into a corner. 
In point of fact, Barbara has long acknowledged that the 
homestead was "distributed" in 2003. R.921 and 1636 
The trial court ruled in 2001 that Barbara's interest was 
not a license but a life estate determinable. R.136, 138 At no 
time has Barbara appealed that ruling. See Uzelac I and Brief 
of Appellant. The Estate then deeded the homestead to Brooke 
and Allyson "subject to a life estate determinable in Barbara 
Uzelac" in 2003. Ex.21 Since 2003 post-distribution rights, 
liabilities and obligations have applied to Barbara. Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-1004. Since 2003, Barbara has had a present 
possessory interest in the homestead. 
Therefore, Brooke and Allyson's "Bob Jones" hypothetical 
rings true. See Brief of Intervenors/Cross-Appellants, p. 19 
Barbara's attempts to distinguish it are phrased in the pre-
distribution period of time when other provisions of the probate 
code are still applicable. When Barbara poses a post-
7 
distribution hypothetical, she has to recognize the 
applicability of Section 1004 proceedings. See Reply Brief of 
Appellant, p. 17. Those proceedings must be "against 
distributees." 
The fact remains that, in 2007, Barbara still has her life 
estate determinable in the homestead property. In the years 
since Louis' death, Barbara has neither moved from the property 
nor remarried. Both in the trial court below and on appeal, 
Barbara has not provided the Court with any citation, precedent 
or authority to justify the court-ordered liquidation of 
distributed property in which a life tenant has a present 
possessory interest. If Barbara chose to move or remarry, the 
homestead would vest in Brooke and Allyson in fee simple. There 
is no basis for a court to order Barbara to move, be paid the 
value of the life estate for the rest of her life (an unknown 
period of time) and receive her devise plus prejudgment 
interest. 
Louis' Will provided that Barbara was "to receive per the 
terms of our antenuptial agreement." Ex.4 That document gave 
Barbara "all property real personal or mixed acquired by the 
parties during the marriage," sought to separate and protect 
premarital property from claims upon death and divorce and gave 
Barbara her life estate determinable. Ex. 1 To allow Barbara 
to receive other than "per the terms" of that antenuptial 
8 
agreement would be contrary to Louis' intent. Louis intended 
Barbara have the life estate. Barbara agreed to quit claim her 
interest in all premarital real property (Ex. 1, p. 2, f 1) "in 
the event of termination of [the] marriage by death . . . " Id. 
B. THE CLAIM FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
1. Classification of Devises 
The argument concerning the classification of devises is 
central to Barbara's claim for prejudgment interest on her 
devise. Barbara incorrectly states in her Reply Brief that 
Brooke and Allyson "claim for the first time on appeal that 
Barbara's devise is a general devise chargeable to specific 
property." Reply Brief of Appellant, p.3 There is no question 
these issues were properly raised and preserved below. This 
position was argued on remand with Barbara's counsel in 
attendance. However, the remand transcript was not initially 
made a part of the record on appeal. R.1780 
Utah R. App. P. 24(h) states that "If any difference arises 
as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the 
trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by 
that court and the record made to conform to the truth . . . 
[t]he appellate court, either before or after the record is 
transmitted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be 
corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be 
certified and transmitted." See Motion to Augment the Record 
9 
and to Strike Exhibit A to Appellant's Reply Brief dated April 
23, 2007. This Court can and should recognize the 1/30/06 
transcript and make it a part of the record. 
Barbara's devise granted her "all property, real, personal 
or mixed acquired by the parties during the marriage." Ex. 1, % 
5 This is not a "general pecuniary devise" on which interest is 
statutorily assessed. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-904. It was a 
devise chargeable to premarital property. As it turned out at 
the time of Louis' death, there was no real property and there 
was no mixed property. The personal property "acquired during 
the marriage" consisted only of cash. R.1751, f 4 On remand 
the trial court took the value in Louis' personal accounts at 
the time of the marriage and subtracted that from the value in 
all of Louis' accounts at his death. This ultimately resulted 
in a monetary figure ($230,660). R.1757 The devise itself, 
however, was not for $230,6604. It was for "all property, real 
personal or mixed acquired by the parties during the marriage" 
and "held at death." Uzelac I at fn 2; 2 005 UT App 234. 
2. The Creditor Argument 
Again in the Reply Brief of Appellant, Barbara's creditor 
argument reappears in support of the prejudgment interest 
claim. See Reply Brief of Appellant, pp. 9-10. This issue was 
4
 In fact, the value of the POD accounts should not have been 
included in the calculation as argued below. 
10 
raised repeatedly at trial (Tr.60) barred by the Court of 
Appeals first decision (R.14865) and rejected on remand. R.1750-
1751 Yet again, Barbara argues "Louis is presumed to know that 
Barbara was entitled to be a creditor of the estate who would 
receive payment prior to any other beneficiary." Reply Brief of 
Appellant, p. 9. Barbara argues that since Louis knew she would 
be a creditor, her devise must be a general pecuniary devise 
(entitling her to interest) . Id. Louis did not "know Barbara 
would be a creditor;" he spelled out her entitlements clearly. 
Barbara's devise6 is specifically "all property, whether 
real, personal or mixed acquired by the parties." Ex.1, p. 2, 
% 5 Louis provided that Barbara "shall receive per the terms of 
the AnteNuptial Agreement" (Ex.4, p.l); other terms of 
that same AnteNuptial Agreement include: 
• The parties both had children and separate property 
prior to the marriage (Ex.1, p.l) 
• Barbara's interest in the homestead is defined as a 
life estate determinable; nothing more (Ex.1, p.2, 
11 3) 
5
 Uzelac I, MI 11-14. 
6
 Curiously, in the court below, Barbara characterized her 
entitlements under the antenuptial agreement and will as 
"damages." R.1640 Damages are awarded, not devised. Damages 
are not consistent with the concept of a "general pecuniary 
devise" on which interest is statutorily assessed. 
11 
• The nature of premarital property is not changed by 
selling, converting or exchanging it (Ex.1, p. 3, 
11 9) 
Brooke and Allyson do not attempt to "insert words" into the 
documents; rather they articulate the obvious and plain meaning 
of them. 
3. "Prejudice" against Barbara 
The purpose of pages 27-28 and footnote 18 (the alleged 
"personal attacks") in Brooke and Allyson's opening brief was to 
demonstrate why Barbara's devise was not capable of 
quantification in 2000 ("one year after the first appointment of 
a personal representative"). Barbara made quite a number of 
unsuccessful claims, which if successful would have been 
monetary in nature, in her Complaint against the personal 
representative. Certain pleadings in the record below are 
particularly illustrative of this. See R.61, R.208, R.693, 
R.828 and R.836 Indeed, the alleged "personal attacks7" about 
7
 In reality, no personal attacks have been made. Certainly, 
credibility arguments are properly made to the trial judge. 
Without question, however, this is an unfortunate case in which 
litigation has been prolific. Barbara's numerous unsuccessful 
claims and tactics in the case explain how the parties find 
themselves in this appeal in 2007. The claims and tactics also 
explain why Barbara is not entitled to interest on her devise, 
the amount of which she has disputed and attempted to augment 
for seven years. 
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which counsel complains in his Reply Brief are actually 
contained in the record below and not on appeal. 
C. THE POD ACCOUNTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT'S EQUATION. 
The only facts necessary to a determination of the POD 
issue are marshaled in Brooke and Allyson's opening brief at 
pages 11 through 13. Some of the monetary amounts the trial 
court included in its Judgment were in POD accounts and not 
"held at death." Since by definition, the POD accounts were not 
"held at death" they should not have been included in Judge 
Dever's mathematical calculation. The amount in the POD 
accounts, $201,839.15, should be subtracted from Barbara's 
devise. R.1006 
Brooke and Allyson simply ask the Court to rule the POD 
accounts were definitionally not part of the Estate and should 
not have been included in the calculation and to remand the case 
to the trial court to recalculate the amounts and amend the 
Judgment. Additionally, it is not true that the POD issue is 
raised for the first time on appeal. R.1587; see also Motion to 
Augment the Record and to Strike Exhibit A to Appellant's Reply 
Brief, dated April 23, 2007 at pp. 5-6. 
CONCLUSION 
The only error in the trial court's remand Judgment was the 
inclusion of monies in POD accounts in the calculation of "all 
13 
property acquired during the marriage and held at Husband's 
death." 
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2007. 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
lAjJl^sQ, 
'st^i-
Marg&ret H. Olson, Esq. 
Of Counsel 
Counsel for Intervenors/ 
Cross Appellants Susan Brooke 
Mageras and Allyson D. Uzelac 
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